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PROOF OF AGGRAVATION UNDER THE
CALIFORNIA UNIFORM DETERMINATE
SENTENCING ACT:
THE CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES
by Gerald F. Uelmen*
I. INTRODUCTION: SENTENCING MODELS
Responding to criticism that the unbridled discretion of parole
boards resulted in unacceptable disparities in the punishment meted
out to similar offenders for similar crimes,' the California legislature
enacted the Uniform Determinate Sentencing Act of 1976.2 By pre-
senting a narrow range of choices to the sentencing judge and creating
explicit factual guidelines to control those choices, subject to appellate
review, the Act promises greater consistency in sentencing results. 3
The California Act confronts a judge who is sentencing a defendant
to prison with three choices: a middle term, a lesser term when cir-
cumstances of mitigation are shown, and a greater term when circum-
stances of aggravation are shown.' Aggravating and mitigating circum-
stances are described in rules adopted by the California Judicial
Council.- The judge must support his choice of the term with a state-
* B.A., 1962 (Loyola University of Los Angeles); J.D., 1965, LL.M., 1966 (George-
town University Law Center); Professor of Law, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles.
The author wishes to acknowledge the editorial assistance of Allan Ides, Loyola Law
School '79, in the preparation of this article. Helpful comments based on a reading
of the manuscript were also received from Mark Overland, Deputy Public Defender, Los
Angeles, and Judge Stanley P. Golde of the Alameda County Superior Court.
1. See generally Transcript of the Hearing on the Indeterminate Sentencing Law by
the Senate Select Comm. on Penal Institutions, Cal. Senate (1974).
2. Act of Sept. 20, 1976, ch. 1139, [1976] Cal. Stats. -, as amended by Act of June
29, 1977, ch. 165, [1977] Cal. Stats. -
3. This approach is strikingly similar to the sentencing provisions of the Federal
Criminal Code Reform Act of 1977 now pending in Congress. See S. 1437, 95th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1977). See also G. Uelmen, Federal Sentencing Reform: The Emerging
Constitutional Issues (Sept. 17, 1977) (unpublished manuscript prepared for the South-
western University Law Review First West Coast Conference on Constitutional Law,
Sept. 17-18, 1977).
4. Act of June 29, 1977, ch. 165, § 15, [1977] Cal. Stats. - (to be codified in CAL.
PENAL CODE § 1170(b)). See Oppenheim, Computing a Determinate Sentence . . .
New Math Hits the Courts, 51 CAL. ST. B.J. 604 (1976).
5. CAL. RULES OF COURT 421, 423 (effective July 1, 1977).
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ment of reasons, and the defendant may challenge that choice on ap-
peal.
To illustrate the effect of these changes, we can compare a defend-
ant convicted of armed robbery before and after the new law. Before
the new law took effect, robbery was punishable by an indeterminate
sentence of one year to life in prison; if the jury found the defendant
was armed with a dangerous or deadly weapon, the possible sentence
was five years to life in prison." The defendant convicted'of ordinary
robbery was eligible for parole after serving one year, but a defendant
convicted of armed robbery had to serve one third of the five year mini-
mum before being eligible for release on parole.7  The actual parole
release date and length of the parole term were determined by the
Adult Authority, based on a subjective judgment of the defendant's
progress toward rehabilitation. 8 Under the new law, armed robbery
is no longer defined as a separate crime. Robbery is punishable by
two, three or four years.9 Ordinarily, the three year term is imposed,
unless aggravating circumstances are shown to justify the four year
term, or mitigating circumstances are shown to justify the two year
term.1" Among the aggravating circumstances which justify the four
year term is proof that the defendant was armed.11 Alternatively, the
fact that the defendant was armed can be pleaded and proven as "en-
hancement," which also adds one year to the sentence to be served.12
The defendant is not eligible for release on parole until he has served
two-thirds of the sentence,' 3 and the parole term is ordinarily limited
to one year.
14
While these reforms may correct the most serious disparities in sen-
tences, they inject procedural changes into the sentencing process
which raise substantial issues of constitutional magnitude. If the sen-
tencing judge is required to make new factual findings to justify the
sentence, a whole panoply of procedural rights under the rubric of "due
process" may apply, including the right to standards which are not
"vague," adequate notice, confrontation and cross-examination of wit-
6. CAL. PENAL CODE § 211a, 213 (West 1970) (amended 1976).
7. Id. § 3049.
8. Id. § 3020.
9. Act of June 29, 1977, ch. 165, § 5, [1977] Cal. Stats. - (to be codified in CAL.
PENAL CODE § 213).
10. Id. § 15 (to be codified in CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170(b)).
11. CAL. RULES OF COURT 421 (a) (2) (effecti e July 1, 1977).
12. Act of June 29, 1977, ch. 165, § 91, [1977] Cal. Stats. - (to be codified in CAL.
PENAL CODE § 12022).
13. Id. § 38 (to be codified in CAL. PENAL CODE § 2931(a)).
14. Id. § 42 (to be codified in CAL. PENAL CODE § 3000(a)).
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nesses, the right to exclude unlawfully obtained evidence, proof beyond
a reasonable doubt, a jury trial, explicit findings, and appellate review.
The magnitude of the impact such changes could have upon the
criminal justice system is great. While ten to fifteen per cent of Cali-
fornia defendants now avail themselves of all of the procedural rights
of a trial,15 all convicted defendants are ultimately subject to the sen-
tencing process, including the eighty-five to ninety per cent who plead
guilty. Even if the full array of due process rights is made available
only to the twenty-eight per cent of felony defendants who receive
prison or jail sentences,' 6 we face the possibility of a vast multiplication
of the commitment of judicial resources to what is now a rather routine
and expeditious process.
As the law has evolved thus far, two basic models of the sentencing
process have emerged. The traditional model, which we can label the
"discretion" model, gives the judge relatively free access to information
for sentencing. In Williams v. New York,17 upholding the imposition
of a death penalty on the basis of information contained in a pre-
sentence report to the judge, the Court reasoned that "modem concepts
individualizing punishment have made it all the more necessary that
a sentencing judge not be denied an opportunity to obtain pertinent
information by a requirement of rigid adherence to restrictive rules of
evidence properly applicable to the trial."' 8  The Court did not hold'
that the sentencing process is immune from due process scrutiny, how-
ever, noting that the defendant was represented by counsel and was
not deprived of an opportunity to present evidence. 19 Only the rights
to reasonable notice of the charges and to an opportunity to examine ad-
verse witnesses Were explicitly rejected.20
The second model, which we will call the "enhancement" model,
finds its paradigm in Specht v. Patterson.2' There the Court con-
fronted a proceeding whereby a defendant convicted of indecent liber-
ties, a crime carrying a maximum sentence of ten years, could be found
to be a "threat of bodily harm to the public" or an "habitual offender"
and given an indeterminate sentence of one day to life.22 The finding
15. See CAL. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CRIME AND DELINQUENCY IN CALIFORNIA 32 (1975).
16. Id.
17. 337 U.S. 241 (1949).
18. Id. at 247.
19. Id. at 245 n.3.
20. Id. at 245, 250-52.
21. 386 U.S. 605 (1967).
22. Colorado Sex Offenders Act, COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 39-19-1 to -10 (1963)
(repealed 1972).
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was made on the basis of a psychiatric report submitted to the Court.
Noting that the finding that the defendant was a public threat or ha-
bitual offender was a new finding of fact which was not an ingredient
of the offense charged, the Court found the situation "radically differ-
ent" from Williams v. New York.23 This difference entitled the de-
fendant to the "full panoply of the relevant protections which due
process guarantees in state criminal proceedings,"24 including "that he
be present with counsel, have an opportunity to be heard, be con-
fronted with witnesses against him, have the right to cross-examine, and
to offer evidence of his own. And there must be findings adequate
to make meaningful any appeal that is allowed."25  The absence of a
right to proof beyond a reasonable doubt and a jury trial from this cata-
logue of rights may simply be explained by noting that the cases holding
these rights to be incorporated within due process had not yet been
decided.
26
The essential difference between the "discretion" model and the
"enhancement" model is the existence in the latter of an explicit factual
predicate for punishment which was not an essential element of the
underlying crime. But these two models are not mutually exclusive;
it would be more accurate to characterize them as representing opposite
ends of a spectrum. Due process is no longer the "all or none"
proposition suggested in Specht v. Patterson. As stated by the Court
more recently in Morrissey v. Brewer:
Once it is determined that due process applies, the question remains
what process is due. It has been said so often by this Court and others
as not to require citation of authority that due process is flexible and
calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation de-
mands.27
The purpose of this paper is to review the major procedural protections
encompassed within due process, and to consider their applicability
to the sentencing aggravation procedures envisioned in the California
statute. We will find that these procedures do not always fit comfort-
ably into either the "discretion" or the "enhancement" models.
23. 386 U.S. at 608.
24. Id. at 609 (quoting United States ex rel. Gerchman v. Maroney, 355 F.2d 302,
312 (3d Cir. 1962)).
25. Id. at 610.
26. The right to jury trial was incorporated one year later, Duncan v. Louisiana, 391
U.S. 145 (1968), while incorporation of the right to proof beyond a reasonable doubt
came three years later. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
27. 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972).
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-II. LEGISLATIVE PARALLELS
In seeking the answer to the question "what process is due," the
ambiguous terrain we tread is not untrodden. At least two other legis-
lative devices raise a similar galaxy of issues.
First, we have the death penalty statutes enacted in response to the
holding in Furman v. Georgia28 that a discretionary death penalty vio-
lates the eighth amendment's proscription of "cruel and unusual
punishment." These statutes require the finding of specified "aggra-
vating circumstances" to justify the imposition of a penalty of death.
This separate factual finding may take these provisions outside the realm
of Williams v. New York. Yet the enhancement model of Specht v.
Patterson might be distinguished since the aggravating circumstances
frequently bear a close relationship to the underlying crime. Nonethe-
less, each of the death penalty statutes subsequently upheld by the Su-
preme Court29 provides an explicit list of aggravating circumstances,30
an opportunity to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses,
3'
proof beyond a reasonable doubt to a jury,"2 and explicit factual find-
ings which are subject to appellate review. 3 The statutes of Georgia
and Texas also provide a defendant with advance notice of which ag-
gravating circumstances are being relied upon.34 In the one state
where the judge is vested with discretion to disregard the jury's
recommendation and impose a death penalty, the Court, in Gardner
28. 408 U.S. 238 (1971) (per curiam).
29. See Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242
(1976); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
30. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141(5) (West Supp. 1977); GA. CODE ANN. § 27-2534.1
(b) (Supp. 1976); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. tit. 5, § 19.03 (Vernon 1974).
31. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141(1) (West Supp. 1977); GA. CODE ANN. § 27-2503
(Supp. 1976); TEX. CODE CraM. PRoc. art. 37.071(a) (Vernon Supp. 1976-77).
32. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141(1) (West Supp. 1977); GA. CODE ANN. § 27-2534.1
(c) (Supp. 1976); TEx. CODE Calm. PROC. art. 37.071(c) (Vernon Supp. 1976-77). The
jury, under Florida law, serves only in an advisory capacity in the sentencing process.
However, if the jury recommends a life sentence, the judge may not impose the death
penalty unless "the facts suggesting a sentence of death ... [are] so clear and con-
vincing that virtually no reasonable person could differ.3' Tedder v. State, 322 So. 2d
908, 910 (Fla. 1975).
33. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141(3), (4) (West'Supp. 1977); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 27-
2534.1(c), 27-2537 (Supp. 1976); TEX. CODE Caim. PRoc. art. 37.071(c), (f) (Vernon
Supp. 1976-77).
34. GA. CODE ANN. § 27-2503(a) (Supp. 1976) provides that "only such evidence in
aggravation as the state has made known to defendant prior to trial shall be admissible."
TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. tit. 5, § 19.03 (Vernon 1974) makes the "aggravating circum-
stance" an element of crime which must be pleaded in the initial charge. But cf. FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 921.141(1) (West Supp. 1977), which allows the court to consider evi-
dence "as to any matter that the court deems relevant to the sentence."
1977]
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v. Florida,3" held that a presentence investigation report relied upon
by the sentencing judge in such circumstances must be disclosed in its
entirety to defense counsel, thus limiting its prior holding in Williams
v. New York36 to non-capital cases.
Similarly, the California death penalty law recently enacted over the
governor's veto provides for a full array of due process protections.37
A death penalty may not be imposed unless the jury finds that enumer-
ated "special circumstances" were present,3 8 and considers other evi-
dence presented in aggravation.30 Not only must the special circum-
stances be alleged and specifically found to be true beyond a reason-
able doubt,40 but no additional evidence in aggravation can be
presented unless notice of the evidence to be introduced was given to
the defendant before trial.41  The special circumstances must be
proven by competent evidence, subject to the same opportunity to con-
front and cross-examine which applies at the trial.42
A second parallel is the federal "dangerous special offender" sen-
tencing provisions presented in the Organized Crime Control Act of
197043 and the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control
Act of 1970.14  Both provide that a defendant convicted of a felony
may receive a sentence in excess of the normal maximum, up to a
maximum of twenty-five years, upon a finding he is a "dangerous
special offender. ' 45  The statutes specifically provide that a notice of
the prosecutor's jintent to rely upon the dangerous special offender pro-
visions must be filed prior to trial, and that the defendant has a right
to counsel, compulsory process, cross-examination, specific factual find-
ings and appellate review of the determination that he is a dangerous
special offender.46 The statutes do, however, permit reliance upon
hearsay in presentence reports, limited non-disclosure of such reports,
and provide that the burden of proof is merely a preponderance of
35. 97 S. Ct. 1197, 1207 (1977).
36. See notes 17-20 supra and accompanying text.
37. Act of Aug. 11, 1977, ch. 316, [1977] Cal. Stats.-.
38. Id. § 9 (to be codified in CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2).
39. Id. § 11 (to be codified in CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.3).
40. Id. § 12 (to be codified in CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.4(a)).
41. Id. § 11 (to be codified in CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.3).
42. Id. § 12 (to be codified in CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.4(a)). See CAL. Evm.
CODE § 711 (West 1966).
43. 18 U.S.C. § 3575 (1970).
44. 21 U.S.C. § 849 (1970).
45. 18 U.S.C. § 3575(b) (1970); 21 U.S.C. § 849(b) (1970).
46. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3575(a)-(b), 3576 (1970); 21 U.S.C. § 849(a)-(b), (h) (1970).
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the evidence, to be determined by a judge sitting without a jury.47
This middle position was justified by the draftsmen by noting that
"[tihe requirements of Specht v. Patterson . . .are inapplicable, since
no separate charge triggered by an independent offense is at issue.
Only circumstances of aggravation of the offense for which the convic-
tion was obtained are before the court. '4
8
As we review each of the proceduril rights in the due process
panoply, it will be enlightening to compare the judicial treatment of
these two legislative parallels.
III. REQUIREMENTS OF PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS
A. Defining Aggravating Circumstances: The
Problem of Vagueness
The task of defining circumstances of aggravation and mitigation
under the California law was delegated by the legislature to the Cali-
fornia Judicial Council, a body composed of representatives of all
California courts.49  Drafting reasonably detailed and explicit standards
is a formidable undertaking, perhaps best done by an administrative
body. Whether that administrative body should be a judicial one, how-
ever, raises an intriguing question of separation of powers, since the
constitutionality of the standards adopted will ultimately be resolved by
the courts.50
The constitutional issues raised by the formulation of these standards
are serious ones. The right to explicit definitions which are not vague
is an essential of due process of law. Two rationales support this doc-
trine of vagueness: the lack of fair notice to potential defendants, 5'
and the danger of discriminatory application where the law is vague.
52
47. 18 U.S.C. § 3575(b) (1970); 21 U.S.C. § 849(b) (1970).
48. S. REP. No. 91-617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 163-64 (1969) (citation omitted).
49. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170.3 (West Supp. 1977).
50. See, e.g., the opinion of Justices Douglas and Black dissenting to the promulgation
of the Rules of Procedure for the Trial of Minor Offenses before United States Magis-
trates, 27 L. Ed. 2d Ivi, at lviii-lx (1971), as well as their opinion on the 1966 Amend-
ments to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. H.R. Doc. No. 390, 89th Cong.,
2d Sess. 14 (1966).
The federal proposal would create an independent "United States Sentencing Commis-
sion" to define the "ranges" of punishment available. S. 1437 tit. II, § 991, 95th Cong.,
1st Sss. (1977).
51. Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451 (1939).
52. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972); Giaccio v. Pennsylvania, 382
U.S. 399 (1966). See also Note, The Void-for-Vagueness Docirine in the Supreme
Court, 109 U. PA. L. Rnv. 67 (1960).
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While both rationales apply with greatest force to the definition of the
crime itself, one cannot simply dismiss the vagueness doctrine as in-
applicable to sentencing enhancement provisions. This much is now
abundantly clear from the Supreme Court opinions considering the con-
stitutionality of statutes defining the "aggravating circumstances" under
which the death penalty may be imposed. The precision with which
those circumstances were defined was of central concern to the Court.
In Gregg v. Georgia,5" for example, the Court carefully examined each
of ten categories of aggravating circumstances in the Georgia statute
in terms of vagueness or overbreadth. In the plurality opinion Justice
Stewart noted with approval that the Georgia Supreme Court, in
Arnold v. State,54 had already declared one statutory ground for
capital punishment unconstitutionally vague, and had narrowly con-
strued other grounds.55
The Arnold opinion is instructive for our purposes. The Georgia
Supreme Court was confronted with a defendant sentenced to death
upon the jury's finding of one aggravating circumstance: "[t]he of-
fense . . . was committed by a person . . .who .. . [had] a sub-
stantial history of serious assaultive criminal convictions."' 0 Citing
Grayned v. City of Rockford,57 the court noted that "[w]henever a stat-
ute leaves too much room for personal whim and subjective decision-
making without a readily ascertainable standard or minimal, objective
guidelines for its application, it cannot withstand constitutional scru-
tiny."" Applying this standard, the Georgia court found the term
"substantial history" unconstitutionally vague, concluding, "While
we might be more willing to find such language sufficient in another
context, the fact that we are here concerned with the imposition of a
death sentence compels a different result."59
The conclusion that the vagueness doctrine applies to sentence
enhancement provisions does not, of course, mean that it applies with
the same force as when the doctrine is applied to definitions of crime.
The doctrine has always been applied with varying degrees of strictness,
depending upon the context. The strictest application has always been
reserved for cases where first amendment liberties were at stake.60
53. 428 U.S. 153 (1976) (opinion of Stewart, 1.).
54. 236 Ga. 534, 224 S.E.2d 386 (1976).
55. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 166 n.9, 201-03 (1976) (opinion of Stewart, J.).
56. GA. CODE ANN. § 27-2534.1(b) (1) (Supp. 1976).
57. 408 U.S. 104 (1972).
58. Arnold v. State, 236 Ga. 534, 541, 224 S.E.2d 386, 391 (1976).
59. Id. at 542, 224 S.E.2d at 392.
60. Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 150-51 (1959).
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Similarly, a higher standard of strictness is recognized where the statute
defines the availability of capital punishment. 61 At the other end of
the spectrum are cases suggesting "greater leeway" with respect to
"regulatory statutes governing business activities."62 This variable stan-
dard is consistent with the Supreme Court's interpretation of the stan-
dards of procedural due process.
Thus, the first step in applying the constitutional test of vagueness
to definitions of aggravating circumstances is to ascertain the extent of
aggravation permitted. The extent of aggravation should not, however,
be measured in purely quantitative terms: the real issue is one of pro-
portion. For example, the aggravation of a two year sentence to a
three year sentence under the California law permits a fifty per cent
increase in the punishment being meted out; at the other end of the
spectrum, adding one year to a six year sentence is an increase of less
than seventeen per cent. This distinction was not lost on the drafts-
men of the dangerous special offender provisions contained in current
federal law. The increased sentence permitted upon a finding that the
defendant is a dangerous special offender is limited to a term "not dis-
proportionate in severity to the maximum term otherwise authorized
by law.""3  Apparently, this limitation was intended as an end-run
around Specht v. Patterson, in the belief Specht only applies where a
separate charge triggered by an independent offense is at issue. The
proportionality limitation was designed to insure that the increased sen-
tence did not represent a penalty for a different crime. At least one
court was persuaded by this argument,64 although it contradicts the fol-
lowing rather specific language in Specht:
The Sex Offenders Act does not make the commission of a specified
crime the basis for sentencing. It makes one conviction the basis for
commencing another proceeding under another act to determine whether
a person constitutes a threat of bodily harm to the public, or is an
habitual offender and mentally ill. This is a new finding of fact that
was not an ingredient of the offense charged.65
A persuasive argument can be made that, even if Specht is limited
to a separate offense, whether the aggravating circumstance states a
61. Arnold v. State, 236 Ga. 534, 542, 224 S.E.2d 386, 392 (1976).
62. Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 162 (1972).
63. 18 U.S.C. § 3575(b) (1970); 21 U.S.C. § 849(b) (1970).
64. United States v. Stewart, 531 F.2d 326, 332-35 (6th Cir. 1976) (noting that
§ 3575 does not create a distinct criminal charge but merely provides for an increase
in the penalty for the offense itself).
65. Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605, 608 (1967) (citation omitted).
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separate offense should be determined by a comparison of the nature
of the aggravating circumstance and the nature of the offense, rather
than by looking to the extent of aggravation permitted. Using this
standard, it is clear that many of the aggravating circumstances spe-
cified in rule 421 adopted by the California Judicial Council do state
a separate offense, at least to the same extent the Colorado Sex Of-
fender Act did. A sentence can be aggravated if the defendant "has
engaged in a pattern of violent conduct," 6 if he has "numerous" prior
convictions, 7 or if he threatened witnesses or suborned perjury.0 8
The test of proportionality remains a more significant part of the
equation, however. Attempting to determine whether the aggravating
circumstance is characterized as a separate offense or not can quickly
engage us in a label game. The real focus of our inquiry should be
what is at stake for the defendant. Applying this test, we can see that
the California approach of broadly defining aggravating circumstances
across the board, to be applied to all crimes and all sentencing ranges,
may create difficulties. Although the definitions may be precise
enough in one context, they may not be sufficiently precise in
another.6 9
The second step in our vagueness analysis should be to determine
the extent of "free play" in the definitions of aggravating circumstan-
ces, to insure that prosecutors and judges are held to ascertainable stan-
dards in applying them. When we confront an aggravating circum-
stance which is so broad and amorphous it could be plausibly used
against any defendant, we face the very danger that the vagueness doe-
trine is designed to prevent: the prosecutor can pick and choose the
defendants against whom the provision will be utilized virtually at
whim.
Applying this standard to the aggravating circumstances contained
in rule 321 promulgated by the California Judicial Council, we see
some rather startling examples of vagueness. Under rule 421 (a) (3),
circumstances in aggravation include a finding that "the victim was par-
ticularly vulnerable." Every victim, of course, is "vulnerable." What
makes a victim "particularly" vulnerable is left to our imagination:
66. CAL. Rut.Es oF COURT 421(b)(1) (effective July 1, 1977).
67. Id. 421(b) (2).
68. Id. 421(a) (6).
69. The sentencing ranges to be formulated by the Federal Sentencing Commission
will apparently be specifically directed to each crime. See Kennedy, Criminal Sentenc-
ing: A Game of Chance, 60 JuD. 208, 213-14 (1976), reprinted in 123 CoNM. REC.
407, 409 (daily ed. Jan. 11, 1977).
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age? sex? physical incapacity? stupidity? time of day or night? A
prosecutor would need little imagination to utilize this circumstance in
virtually every crime that has a victim. Rule 421(a)(8) provides for
aggravation if the "planning, sophistication or professionalism with
which the crime was carried out, or other facts, indicated premedita-
tion." This would seem applicable to all but the most spontaneous of
crimes. Rule 421(a)(11) allows aggravation if "the crime involved
a large quantity of contraband." Frequent use of this provision can
be anticipated in drug prosecutions. In defining the crime of posses-
sion with intent to distribute, at least one court has held that a provi-
sion authorizing conviction based solely on evidence of quantity without
specifying the amount required was void for vagueness7 0 Whether a
quantity is "large" should not be left to the varying subjective judg-
ments of the prosecutors to whom the use of this provision is entrusted.
It appears, again, that attempting to define aggravating circumstan-
ces for all crimes, without particularization, will inevitably lead to broad
and amorphous definitions which may run afoul of the constitutional
prohibition against vagueness.
B. Giving Notice to the Defendant of Aggravating
Circumstances to be Invoked
The California Uniform Determinate Sentencing Act as originally
enacted contained a requirement that circumstances in aggravation or
mitigation "shall only be considered if set forth in a motion made prior
to or at the time set for sentencing." 71 In an amendment adopted on
the eve of the Act's effective date, the requirement of a motion was
eliminated. 72 Thus, a defendant facing sentencing may be given no
advance notice that circumstances in aggravation will be asserted, much
less be informed what particular circumstances will be relied upon.
The absence of notice in these provisions stands in sharp contrast
to the state death penalty procedures upheld by the Supreme Court,
which require that the aggravating circumstances be alleged before
trial,73 and the federal dangerous special offender statutes, requiring
a notice be filed by the prosecuting attorney "a reasonable time before
trial . . . setting out with particularity the reasons why such attorney
70. 'Sharp v. Commonwealth, 213 Va. 269, 192 S.E.2d 217 (1972).
71. Act of Sept. 20, 1976, ch. 1139, § 273, [19761 Cal. Stats. - (amended 1977).
72. Act of June 29, 1977, ch. 165, § 15, [1977] Cal. Stats. - (to be codified in CAL.
PENAL CODE § 1170(b)).
73. See note 34 supra.
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believes the defendant to be a dangerous special offender. '7 4  The re-
quirement of particularity has been strictly construed by the courts
applying this statute. 5
Three rationales can be offered in support of a requirement of
advance notice of aggravating circumstances. First, a defendant can-
not voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently enter a plea to the underly-
ing charge unless he is fully aware of the consequences. 1  While it
might be argued that the imposition of the maximum or "aggravated"
sentence is a possible consequence for every defendant, this argument
overlooks the realities of the decision to enter a plea. A defendant
may be aware of the aggravating circumstances specified by Judicial
Council guidelines, and enter a plea of guilty fully confident that these
circumstances do not apply and that the middle sentence or range is
applicable, only to learn at the time of sentencing that the judge is con-
sidering an aggravated sentence.
Secondly, the notice provides a basis for judicial review of the
decision to invoke the aggravation procedure. 77  If the prosecutor is
required to specify the grounds for aggravation to be invoked and the
facts which will be relied upon to prove those grounds, a lengthy hear-
ing might be avoided by allowing the judge to determine, in advance,
that even if the facts are proven, the aggravated term would not be
justified.
Finally, the notice serves the vital function of apprising the defend-
ant of the case against him and enabling him to prepare a defense for the
74. 18 U.S.C. § 3575(a) (1970); 21 U.S.C. § 849(a) (1970). See The Organized
Crime Control Act. Hearings on S.30 Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Laws and Pro-
cedures of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 345 (March 19,
1969) (statement of Henry S. Ruth).
75. In United States v. Kelly, 384 F. Supp. 1394 (W.D. Mo. 1974), afj'd, 519 F.2d
251 (8th Cir. 1975), the court held that notice filed by the prosecution of his intention
to invoke § 3575 was defective in that the notice contained nothing more than an
"unsupported conclusory allegation," that defendant was dangerous within the meaning
of 18 U.S.C. § 3575(f) (1970). The court suggested that a statement of the factual
basis upon which the allegations rested was a necessary concomitant of proper notice.
384 F. Supp. at 1399. A similar result was reached in United States v. Duardi, 384
F. Supp. 856; 861, 871, 874 (W.D. Mo. 1974), afj'd, 529 F.2d 123 (8th Cir. 1975).
See also Klein, Extended Terms for Dangerous Offenders Under the Proposed Federal
Criminal Code (S. 1): The Emerging Legislative History, 8 Loy. Cm. LJ. 319, 323-27
(1976) [hereinafter cited as Klein].
76. United States v. Kelly, 384 F. Supp. 1394, 1400 (W.D. Mo. 1974), afj'd, 519
F.2d 251 (8th Cir. 1975); United States v. Edwards, 379 F. Supp. 617, 621 (M.D. Fla.
1974)..
77. See United States v. Duardi, 384 F. Supp. 856, 860 (W.D. Mo. 1974), aff'd, 529
F.2d 123 (8th Cir. 1975); Klein, supra note 75, at 330.
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hearing on the applicability of aggravating circumstances.78 It is un-
realistic to expect a defendant to respond to every possible aggravating
circumstance that might be asserted, especially where a veritable
catalogue of seventeen possibilities is presented.
The first rationale really raises an issue as to the validity of a plea,
rather than the validity of the sentence. If a defendant who entered
a plea of guilty were to receive an aggravated sentence without notice,
the appropriate remedy would be to vacate the conviction and permit
withdrawal of the plea, rather than merely to invalidate the sentence.79
The second rationale is concededly non-constitutional. While the
avoidance of unnecessary hearings is a laudable legislative goal, it is
not compelled by the Constitution.8 ° The insufficiency of a factual
basis can be reviewed on appeal following a full hearing. It is the last
rationale, the "apprising function," that gives rise to the most serious
constitutional objections to the lack of requirements for advance notice.
Clearly, counsel is given an adversarial role to play. The new Cali-
fornia law permits counsel to submit a statement in aggravation or miti-
gation "to dispute facts in the record or the probation officer's report,
or to present additional facts." 81  A "sentencing hearing" is provided,
at which further evidence can be introduced. 2  To expect counsel to
perform this role in the absence of any advance specification of aggra-
vating circumstances is not only unrealistic, it is basically unfair.
It might be argued that counsel's role will not be very different from
that under the conventional "discretion" model, where counsel fre-
quently discovered only at the time of sentencing that the judge was
considering imposing the maximum sentence based on some unantici-
pated antipathy to the circumstances of the crime. But the whole ob-
ject of the California reform proposals is to formalize and rationalize
this exercise of judicial discretion by requiring factual findings to justify
78. Klein, supra note 75, at 329.
79. United States v. Blair, 470 F.2d 331, 339-40 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411
U.S. 908 (1973).
80. See Klein, supra note 75, at 330-31.
81. Act of June 29, 1977, ch. 165, § 15, [1977] Cal. Stats. - (to be codified in CAL.
PENAL CODE § 1170(b)).
82. Id. The nature of the "hearing" envisioned emerges from the Sentencing Rules
promulgated by the California Judicial Council. A single hearing is to be conducted
to determine whether a defendant should be placed on probation, and, if not, the length
of the imprisonment term to be imposed. CAL. RuLEs OF COURT 433 (effective July
1, 1977). The judge may select the upper term "only if, considering the entire record
of the case, including the probation officer's report, all other reports properly filed in the
case and other competent evidence, circumstances in aggravation are established by a
preponderance of the evidence and outweigh circumstances in mitigation." Id. 439 (b).
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the sentence. The opportunity to challenge those factual findings on
appeal has little value if one has no meaningful opportunity to chal-
lenge them at the time they are made. And a meaningful challenge
at the sentencing hearing demands advance notice and an opportunity
to prepare.
It might also be suggested that the disclosure of the presentence
report in advance of sentencing will itself function as a notice of aggravat-
ing circumstances to be relied upon. Such a suggestion could only be
made by someone who has never read a presentence report. It is akin
to suggesting the investigative report of a police officer can serve in
lieu of an indictment. In any event, the new law allows aggravating
circumstances to be found from sources other than the contents of the
probation report. 
3
C. Use and Disclosure of Presentence Reports:
The Right to Confrontation
The California Uniform Determinate Sentencing Act as originally
enacted provided that a finding of circumstances in aggravation could
be based upon "the evidence introduced at the hearing on the motion
and any evidence previously heard by the judge . . . .- Apparently
the absence of any reference to the presentence report was deliberate,
an implicit recognition that only legally admissible evidence should be
used.85 In an amendment adopted on the eve of the Act's effective
date, however, it was provided that a finding of aggravating circumstan-
ces could be based. upon the court's consideration of "the record in the
case, the probation officer's report, other reports including . . . [diag-
nostic reports prepared by the Department of Corrections] and state-
83. CAL. RuLEs OF COURT 439(b) (effective July 1, 1977).
84. Act of Sept. 20, 1976, ch. 1139, § 273, [1976] Cal. Stats. - (amended by Act of
June 29, 1977, ch. 165, § 15, [1977] Cal. Stats. -).
85. See remarks of Judge Bruce F. Allen in California Attorneys for Criminal Justice,
Statewide Criminal Law Seminar Syllabus (April 16, 1977):
Can the probation report which describes the offense be considered by the judge
at the hearing? The county already paid for it and the judge already read it. If
both sides stipulate, then the judge obviously can use it. However, the probation
report is full of hearsay, not admissible under the Evidence Code, and SB 42 limits
the hearing to "evidence introduced at the hearing on the motion and any evi-
dence previously heard by the judge at the trial." The underlined part was in-
cluded in the bill by the author, Senator Nejedly, at my request. At the same
time, he agreed in writing to _include the probation report, and the Ways and Means
Committee adopted that amendment, but when the bill came out in print, the
reference to the probation report was omitted. This unusual legislative procedure
is hardly an oversight and in my ten years in the Legislature, I never before had
anyone, friend or foe, back down in this fashion on an agreed and adopted amend-
ment without notice.
Id. at 38-39 (emphasis in original).
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ments in aggravation or mitigation submitted by the prosecution of the
defendant, and any further evidence introduced at the sentencing
hearing.""6
These provisions raise a substantial issue in terms of the constitu-
tional right to confrontation of witnesses: can a report be relied upon
without affording the defendant an opportunity to cross-examine the
sources of information utilized in the report?
Although this issue was not reached in Gardner v. Floridas7 this is
the battleground on which both Williams v. New York 8 and Specht v.
Patterson8 9 were fought. While the right to cross-examine was re-
jected for the discretion model in Williams, it was mandated as part
of the "full panoply" of due process rights which the Court recognized
in the context of the enhancement model of Specht. It can certainly
be argued that the sentence aggravation procedure envisioned by Cali-
fornia bears a closer resemblance to the enhancement model of
Specht than to the discretion model of Williams; such an argument
will not be dispositive, however, since the Court has explicitly aban-
doned the "full panoply" approach to due process since Specht was de-
cided. 90 The focus of our inquiry should rather be upon the signifi-
cance of cross-examination to truth finding in the context of the factual
questions being resolved.91 The greatest enlightenment in resolving this
inquiry can be found in the Supreme Court's approach to parole and
probation revocation proceedings. In both Morrissey v. Brewer92 and
Gagnon v. Scarpelli,93 the Court concluded due process in these settings
includes the right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses.
Parole and probation revocation, unlike sentencing under the discretion
model, involves a specific factual allegation which must be proved.
This essential difference is highlighted by the contrast between
People v. Vickers94 and People v. Peterson,95 decided seven months
apart by the California Supreme Court. In Vickers, the court held that
86. Act of June 29, 1977, ch. 165, § 15, [1977] Cal. Stats. - (to be codified in CAL.
PENAL CODE § 1170(b)).
87. 97 S. Ct. 1197 (1977). See note 35 supra and accompanying text.
88. 337 U.S. 241 (1949). See notes 17-20 supra and accompanying text.
89. 386 U.S. 605 (1967). See notes 21-26 supra and accompanying text.
90. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 489 (1972).
91. Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 295 (1973); Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S.
74, 89 (1970).
92. 408 U.S. 471, 489 (1972).
93. 411 U.S. 778, 781-82 (1973).
94. 8 Cal. 3d 451, 503 P.2d 1313, 105 Cal. Rptr. 305 (1972).
95. 9 Cal. 3d 717, 511 P.2d 1187, 108 Cal. Rptr. 835 (1973).
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all the procedural protections of Morrissey, including the right to con-
front and cross-examine adverse witnesses, were fully applicable in
hearings for revocation of probation. 9 In Peterson, the court concluded
that a denial of the opportunity to cross-examine a witness was not a
denial of due process at a hearing considering the granting of proba-
tion.97 Since the granting of probation is an exercise of broad judicial
discretion, which does not require any specific factual findings, 8 the
Peterson court found support in Williams v. New York. 9  The revoca-
tion of probation, on the other hand, requires that specific factual issues
be resolved. Thus, just as at a trial, the right of cross-examination must
be afforded to assure the "accuracy of the truth-determining proc-
ess."'100 The parallel between, parole and probation revocation hear-
ings and the factual determinations to be made to justify an aggra-
vated sentence is readily apparent. In fact, one of the circumstances
of aggravation recognized under the California rule is that "[tihe
defendant's prior performance on probation or parole was unsatisfac-
tory."' 0 ' It would certainly be incongruous to deny cross-examination
to resolve this issue when aggravation of a sentence is at stake, while
requiring it when revocation of probation or parole is at stake. The
potential loss of liberty may be even greater in the context of sentence
aggravation.
Even with respect to parole or probation revocation hearings, how-
ever, the United States Supreme Court has recognized a significant
limitation upon the right of cross-examination which has not been im-
posed as a limitation on the right of confrontation at trial: the right
can be disallowed if "the hearing officer specifically finds good cause
for not allowing confrontation.' 0 2 Little guidance is available as to
what might constitute "good cause" for denial of the right. On the one
hand, the Court suggests the process "should be flexible enough to con-
sider evidence including letters, affidavits, and other material that
would not be admissible in an adversary criminal trial."'103 Since the
reason such evidence is excluded at a trial is that it is hearsay and the
party has no opportunity to cross-examine its author, this suggests mere
96. 8 Cal. 3d at 457, 503 P.2d at 1317-18, 105 Cal. Rptr. at 309-10.
97. 9 Cal. 3d at 727, 511 P.2d at 1194-95, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 842-43.
98. People v. Edwards, 18 Cal. 3d 796, 557 P.2d 995, 135 Cal. Rptr. 411 (1976).
99. 9 Cal. 3d at 725-26, 511 P.2d at 1193-94, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 841-42.
100. Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 295 (1973).
101. CAL. RULES OF COURT 421(b) (5) (effective July 1, 1977).
102. Mbrrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 489 (1972).
103. Id.
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unavailability may be "good cause." On the other hand, the Court sug-
gests a stricter test in delineating the circumstances when a defendant
can cross-examine those who supplied adverse information at a pre-
liminary hearing before he is returned to prison: "if the hearing of-
ficer determines that the informant would be subjected to risk of harm
if his identity were disclosed, he need not be subjected to confrontation
and cross-examination.' 10 4  While no clear standard of "good cause"
emerges, it is clear that the burden is upon the state to show specific
reasons why the right must be limited. Such a showing cannot be
based upon arguments which apply to parole or probation procedures
in general.
The confrontation and cross-examination of witnesses permitted in
sentencing hearings under the California law should be at least as great
as that required in parole and probation revocation proceedings.
10 5
The routine reliance upon presentence reports apparently envisioned
by the new law is clearly at odds with the standards announced in Mor-
rissey and Gagnon. In the absence of a compelling showing of particu-
lar reasons to dispense with the right, a defendant contesting -a showing
of aggravating circumstances should have the right to cross-examine all
adverse witnesses.
D. Playing the Label Game: The Problem
of Burden of Proof
To understand the burden of proof issues posed by the California
Uniform Determinate Sentencing Act, the fragility of the labels "ele-
ment of the crime," "enhancement," and "aggravating" or "mitigating"
circumstances must be comprehended. It is now axiomatic that due
process in criminal proceedings requires that every "element of the
crime" must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt.106 At least under
104. Id. at 487.
105. Despite the language in People v. Vickers, 8 Cal. 3d 451, 457, 503 P.2d 1313,
1317-18, 105 Cal. Rptr. 305, 309-10 (1972), that probation revocation proceedings in-
clude "the right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses (unless the hearing
officer specifically finds good cause for not allowing confrontation)," police and proba-
tion reports are apparently being freely admitted in evidence at revocation hearings. In
People v. Turner, 44 Cal. App. 3d 753, 755-56, 118 Cal. Rptr. 924, 926 (1975), the
court held a police report was admissible at a probation revocation hearing, citing the
language of Morrissey. See note 85 supra and accompanying text. It was further noted,
however, that counsel had not requested that the witnesses quoted in the report be
produced at the hearing for cross-examination. People v. Turner, 44 Cal. App. 3d at
756, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 926.
106. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
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the discretion model, however, this burden does not apply to factual
issues at a sentencing hearing. Thus, when California defined two
separate crimes of robbery, carrying a penalty of one year to life, and
armed robbery, carrying a penalty of five years to life, the jury had
to find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was armed before
he was liable for the five to life sentence. Can this result be avoided
simply by defining the crime of robbery, punishable by two, three or
four years, and decreeing that being armed is an "aggravating circum-
stance" which justifies the four year sentence?1
7
Such legislative sleight of hand has apparently won the approval of
the United States Supreme Court. In Mullaney v. Wilbur,108 the Court
held that due process requires the prosecution to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt the absence of heat of passion on sudden provocation
before a defendant could be convicted of murder, reasoning that ab-
sence of provocation was an essential element of the malice required
for murder.10 9 Two years later, in Patterson v. New York,110 the Court
upheld a New York law which required the defendant to prove the "ex-
treme emotional disturbance" which would result in a verdict of man-
slaughter rather than murder, distinguishing Mullaney on the ground
that the New York statute made extreme emotional disturbance an
affirmative defense, whereas the Maine statute construed in Mullaney
resulted in a "presumption" of the absence of provocation which the
defendant had to overcome.'' Protesting this "label game," Justice
Powell, author of the Mullaney opinion, dissented in Patterson:
With all respect, this type of constitutional adjudication is inde-
fensibly formalistic. A limited but significant check on possible abuses
in the criminal law now becomes an exercise in arid formalities. What
Winship and Mullaney had sought to teach about the limits a free
society places on its procedures to safeguard the liberty of its citizens
becomes a rather simplistic lesson in statutory draftsmanship. Nothing
in the Court's opinion prevents a legislature from applying this new
learning to many of the classical elements of the crimes it punishes." -'
107. While such a redefinition could reduce the burden of proof from beyond a rea-
sonable doubt to a preponderance of the evidence, the burden would still be on the prose-
cution. If the label is determinative, the legislature could carry this process a step
further by decreeing all robbers should receive a four year sentence unless they prove
they were not armed, in which case a three year sentence would be imposed. By simply
labeling the same fact a "mitigating" circumstance, rather than an "aggravating" circum-
stance, the entire burden of proof could be shifted to the defendant.
108. 421 U.S. 684 (1975).
109. Id. at 698-700.
110. 97 S. Ct. 2319 (1977).
111. Id. at 2330.
112. Id. at 2334 (dissenting opinion of Powell, J.).
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While legislative sleight of hand may have achieved Supreme Court
acceptance, a slightly different question is presented when the magic
wand is placed in the hands of the prosecutor. Such appears to be one
consequence of the California Uniform Determinate Sentencing Act.
The Act creates a distinction between circumstances justifying "en-
hancement" and circumstances justifying "aggravation." Enhancement
allows an additional penalty to be imposed under five circumstances,
provided none of these circumstances is an element of the underlying
offense:
(1) If the defendant was armed with or uses any deadly weapon, one
additional year may be imposed; 113
(2) If the defendant uses a firearm, two additional years may be
imposed;" 4
(3) If the defendant inflicts great bodily injury upon a victim, three
additional years may be imposed;"15
(4) If a crime involves a property loss in excess of $25,000 one
additional year may be added; if the loss exceeds $100,000, two
additional years may be added;'1 6
(5) If the crime is a "violent" felony, three additional years may be
added for each prior conviction of a "violent" felony.117
Each of these enhancements must be "pleaded and proven as pro-
vided by law," meaning proof beyond a reasonable doubt is required."18
As to aggravating circumstances justifying the highest of the three
sentencing alternatives, the burden of proof required is apparently a
preponderance of the evidence." 9 While the same fact cannot be used
for both enhancement and aggravation, 2 ° frequently the prosecutor
can achieve the same net gain by using a fact for aggravation as could
be achieved by pleading and proving enhancement. The aggravating
circumstances defined in rule 421 of the Judicial Comment include
all of the facts chargeable for purposes of enhancement.' 2' Thus, the
requirement of proof of a fact beyond a reasonable doubt can be totally
113. Act of June 29, 1977, ch. 165, § 91, [1977] Cal. Stats. - (to be codified in CAL.
PENAL CODE § 12022).
114. Id. § 92 (to be codified in CAL. PENAL CODE § 12022.5).
115. Id. § 94 (to be codified in CAL. PENAL CODE § 12022.7).
116. Id. § 93 (to be codified in CAL. PENAL CODE § 12022.6).
117. Id. § 13 (to be codified in CAL. PENAL CODE § 667.5(a)).
118. Id. § 17 (to be codified in CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170.1a(e)).
119. CAL. EviD. CODE § 115 (West 1966); CAL. RULES OF COURT 439(b) (effective
July 1, 1977).
120. Act of June 29, 1977, ch. 165, § 15, [1977] Cal. Stats. - (to be codified in CAL.
PENAL CODE § 1170(b)).
121. CAL. RULES OF COURT 421(a)(1), (a)(2), (a)(10), (b)(3) (effective July 1,
1977).
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avoided by the simple expedient of using the fact for aggravation
rather than enhancement.
In terms of due process, 122 one can respond to this situation in two
ways. While it can be argued that the burden of proof for aggrava-
tion should be the same as that imposed for enhancement-beyond
a reasonable doubt-it might with equal plausibility be suggested that
the burden of proof for enhancement is greater than the Constitution
requires, and that a mere preponderance of the evidence would suffice.
One could cite at least one significant example. The dangerous special
offender provisions of federal law allow enhancement of a sentence by
as much as twenty-five years upon a factual finding of "dangerousness,"
yet permit such a finding to be made "by a preponderance of the infor-
mation."'2 3  This example has yet to receive a full constitutional chal-
lenge on the issue of burden of proof, however. By contrast, every
death penalty statute upheld by the United States Supreme Court has
required proof of aggravating circumstances beyond a reasonable
doubt.' 2
4
The burden of proof to be imposed should not depend upon the label
attached to the proceeding. Rather, the standard of proof required by
due process should depend upon the consequences of an erroneous
factual determination. 12  An erroneous factual finding in the context
of the California Uniform Determinate Sentencing Act has dire conse-
quences for a defendant, increasing the amount of time he must spend
in prison by as much as fifty per cent. While the Court in In re Win-
ship'I premised the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt
upon both the possible loss of liberty and the accompanying stigma of
conviction, 2 these results can also be seen to flow from aggravation
of a sentence. Since the factual premise upon which aggravation may
be based is made a part of the record, the defendant may be "stig-
matized" to the same extent a juvenile is stigmatized by delinquency
proceedings, a sexual psychopath, by mentally disordered sex offender
proceedings, 128 or a narcotics addict, by civil commitment proceed-
122. Apart from due process, the option of enchantment vs. aggravation raises a
substantial issue of equal protection of the laws, which is discussed in the section of
this article dealing with the right to a jury trial. See notes 149-51 infra and accompany-
ing text.
123. 18 U.S.C. § 3575(b) (1970); 21 U.S.C. § 849(b) (1970).
124. See note 32 supra and accompanying text.
125. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 363-64 (1970).
126. 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
127. Id. at 363.
128. People v. Burnick, 14 Cal. 3d 306, 329, 535 P.2d 352, 367-68, 121 Cal. Rptr.
488, 503-04 (1975).
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ings. 120  Indeed, the factual basis for sentence aggravation may be
based on a finding the defendant is "a serious danger to society."1
30
To argue that the loss of liberty or stigmatization is of less consequence
because the defendant has already been convicted of an underlying
crime overlooks the difference between the factual issues involved in
the underlying crime and the factual issues involved in the finding of
aggravation. In holding that a finding a defendant is a mentally dis-
ordered sex offender must be established by proof beyond a reasonable
doubt, the California Supreme Court concluded that "the fact that the
issues at the criminal trial were judged by the reasonable doubt stan-
dard has no bearing on how the distinct issues at the mentally dis-
ordered sex offender proceeding must be proved."' 31  This suggests
a distinction might be made between aggravating circumstances based
on facts relating to the crime, and aggravating circumstances relating
to the defendant. Since a finding of facts related to the crime might
involve no greater stigmatization than the conviction itself, a small in-
crement in the sentence might be justified without the necessity of
proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
Where the aggravating fact is itself an independent crime, the neces-
sity of proof beyond a reasonable doubt is even clearer. Even in the
context of the traditional discretion model, courts have held that a
more severe sentence cannot be imposed on the basis that the defend-
ant lied in his testimony during the trial, since this punishes the defend-
ant for the separate crime of perjury without all of the rights of a trial
on that charge.' 3' From this standpoint, the inclusion of the following
aggravating circumstance in the Judicial Council catalogue raises a
serious question: "Itihe defendant threatened witnesses, unlawfully
prevented or dissuaded witnesses from testifying, suborned perjury, or
in any other way illegally interfered with the judicial process."' 3 3 Each
of these acts is punishable as the separate crimes of subornation of per-
jury, 34 preventing or dissuading attendance of witnesses,3 5 or conspir-
ing to obstruct justice.' 36
129. People v. Thomas, 19 Cal. 3d 630, 640-41, 566 P.2d 228, 232-34, 139 Cal. Rptr.
594, 599-600 (1977).
130. CAL. RuLEs OF CouRT 421(b)(1) (effective July 1, 1977).
131. People v. Burnick, 14 Cal. 3d 329, 330, 535 P.2d 352, 368, 121 Cal. Rptr. 488,
504 (1975).
132. See United States v. Grayson, 550 F.2d 103, 105-08 (3d Cir. 1976).
133. CAL. RULES OF COURT 421(a) (6) (effective July 1, 1977).
134. CAL. PENAL CODE § 127 (West 1970).
135. Id. § 136 (West Supp. 1977).
136. Id. § 182.
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E. The Right to Jury Trial I
The California Uniform Determinate Sentencing Act does not
provide for a jury determination of the facts utilized for aggravation of
a sentence. To argue that due process requires a jury determination
in these circumstances, however, would require us to ignore the strong
parallel to other contexts in which the United States Supreme Court has
upheld the denial of a right to jury trial, even though other procedural
rights, including burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, were
required.
In McKeiver v. Pennsylvania,137 the Court declined to require jury
trials in juvenile court proceedings. Many of the practical considera-
tions which buttressed this ruling are equally applicable to sentencing
proceedings. Although stated as "different" reasons, the Court in
essence repeatedly gave the same reason for concluding a jury trial was
not a constitutional requirement-that is, the formality this would inject
into the proceeding: "[i]f the jury system were to be injected into the
juvenile court system as a matter of right, it would bring with it into
that system the traditional delay, the formality, and the clamor of the
adversary system and, possibly the public trial. '" 8 Much the same ar-
gument could be made with respect to sentencing proceedings, even
under the enhancement model. Substantial delays would be added
to an already overburdened system, at little gain in terms of the reliabil-
ity of the fact finding function.
More recently, the Court has intimated that due process does not
require a jury determination of aggravating facts utilized to impose a
death penalty. In upholding the Florida death penalty statute in
Proffitt v. Florida,139 the Court noted that the sentence is ultimately
determined by the trial judge rather than the jury, concluding that this
may lead to ever greater consistency in the imposition of capital punish-
ment than if the issue were entrusted to less experienced juries.1 40
The Court was also impressed by the appellate review system, under
which the evidence of aggravating and mitigating circumstances is re-
viewed and reweighed to determine independently whether the sen-
tence is warranted.141 If imposition of the ultimate penalty of death
is permissible without a jury determination of aggravating facts, one is
137. 403 U.S. 528 (1971).
138. Id. at 550.
139. 428 U.S. 242 (1976).
140. Id. at 252 (opinion of Stewart, J.).
141. Id. at 250-51.
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hard put to argue such a procedure is required for the imposition of
lesser penalties, especially since the protections alluded to by the Court
in Proffitt are also available under the new California Act, which re-
quires the judge to make explicit factual findings which are subject to
appellate review.
14 2
The guarantees of due process143 and jury trial144 contained in the
California Constitution, of course, may be interpreted more expansively
than the corresponding federal provisions. However, the California
Supreme Court has declined to utilize the California Constitution as a
basis to distinguish McKeiver, refusing to recognize a right to jury trial
in juvenile court cases.' 45  The issue will not be presented with respect
to California's death penalty, since a right to jury determination of ag-
gravating circumstances is specifically recognized in the statute.1' But
the California Constitution was relied upon to recognize a right to a
unanimous jury verdict in commitment proceedings under both men-
tally disordered sex offender proceedings' 47 and the commitment of
narcotics addicts.' 48 A plausible argument can certainly be made that
aggravation hearings present a close parallel to these cases.
Even if a jury trial is not held to be required by the due process
clause of the federal or state constitutions, however, an argument can
certainly be made that a jury trial is required by the constitutional right
to equal protection of the laws. As previously noted in the discussion
of burden of proof, the same facts may be relied upon for either en-
hancement or aggravation. If used for enhancement, the facts must
be pleaded and proved to the trier of fact. Thus, if the enhancement
route is used, the defendant is afforded a jury trial. If the aggravation
route is used, a jury trial is denied.
This choice of procedures is analogous to that presented to the
Supreme Court in Humphrey v. Cady.4 ' In Humphrey, the petitioner
142. Act of June 29, 1977, ch. 165, § 15, [1977] Cal. Stats. - (to be codified in CAL.
PENAL CODE § 1170(b)).
143. CAL. CoNsr. art. I, § 7, subd. (a).
144. Id. § 16.
145. People v. Superior Court (Carl W.), 15 Cal. 3d 271, 274, 539 P.2d 807, 809,
124 Cal. Rptr. 47, 49 (1975). Cf. Kirkpatrick v. Clarence B., 37 Cal. App. 3d 676,
679, 112 Cal. Rptr. 474, 475 (1974) (noting that constitutional right to jury trial not
extended to juvenile court proceedings).
146. Act of Aug. 11, 1977, ch. 316, § 12, [1977] Cal. Stats. - (to be codified in CAL.
PENAL CODE § 190.4(a)).
147. People v. Feagley, 14 Cal. 3d 338, 350, 535 P.2d 373, 380, 121 Cal. Rptr. 509,
516 (1975).
148. People v. Thomas, 19 Cal. 3d 630, 638-41, 566 P.2d 228, 232-34, 139 Cal. Rptr.
594, 598-600 (1977).
149. 405 U.S. 504 (1972).
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had been committed under the Wisconsin Sex Crimes Act, which did
not provide for a jury trial, even though the procedure for commitment
under the general Mental Health Act did grant a right to jury trial.
The Court observed that the two acts were not mutually exclusive and
remanded for a full evidentiary hearing, noting:
The equal protection claim would seem to be especially persuasive if
it develops on remand that petitioner was deprived of a jury determina-
tion, or of other procedural protections merely by the abritrary deci-
sion of the State to seek his commitment under one statute rather
than the other.150
Similar reasoning was adopted by the California Supreme Court in
holding that an unanimous jury verdict was required for commitment
of mentally disordered sex offenders since commitment of mentally dis-
ordered persons under the Lanterman-Petris-Short Act required jury
unanimity."5' The availability of a jury trial should not depend upon
whether the prosecutor has chosen to utilize proceedings labeled "en-
hancement" or proceedings labeled "aggravation." Thus, at least
where aggravation is sought on the grounds specified in Judicial Council
rule 421(a) (1), (2), (10) or 421 (b) (3), the defendant should have
a right to a jury determination of the facts, with proof beyond a rea-
sonable doubt.
F. Appellate Review: The Need for Findings
While there is no recognized constitutional right to appellate review
of a judgment of conviction, much less of a sentence, where appellate
remedies are made available by statute, due process requires that
"there. . . be findings adequate to make meaningful any appeal that
is allowed."', 2  The absence of any right to appellate review has
rendered findings unnecessary under the traditional discretion model
of sentencing,' 58 with rare exceptions.
54
The California Uniform Determinate Sentencing Act makes no
specific reference to appellate review, but does require that the sen-
tencing judge set forth on the record both "the facts and reasons for
imposing the upper or lower term," and the facts and reasons for his
150. Id. at 512.
151. People v. Feagley, 14 Cal. 3d 338, 352, 535 P.2d 373, 381-82, 121 Cal. Rptr.
509, 517-18 (1975).
152. Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605, 610 (1967).
153. United States v. Thompson, 541 F.2d 794 (9th Cir. 1976); United States v. Car-
den, 428 F.2d 1116 (8th Cir. 1970).
154. See, e.g., United States v. Capriola, 537 F.2d 319 (9th Cir. 1976).
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sentence choice.' 5 These determinations will be reviewable by virtue
of preexisting Penal Code provisions permitting a defendant to appeal
from a sentence.' 56 While these provisions have been interpreted to
limit the scope of appellate review to correcting errors of law or an
abuse of discretion, 157 an erroneous finding of aggravation based on in-
sufficient evidence would certainly be a reviewable error of law, as
would a failure to find mitigation where evidence was sufficient. The
reviewing court could itself reduce the sentence or remand'the case for
resentencing. 5 s There are no provisions allowing the prosecutor to
appeal a sentence, however, so an erroneous finding of mitigation or
failure to find aggravation cannot be challenged on appeal.
Factual findings will ordinarily be made in terms of the specific cir-
cumstances of aggravation specified in rule 421.159 Since it can be an-
ticipated that the prosecutor will frequently allege numerous aggravat-
ing circumstances, the reviewing court will frequently face a dilemma
where more than one aggravating circumstance was found. If one ag-
gravating circumstance is found to be insufficient, must an aggravated
sentence be set aside if there are other aggravating circumstances
which were sufficiently proven? The answer is apparently yes, since
a finding of some or even all of the alleged circumstances of aggrava-
tion does not require that the upper term be imposed.'" Thus, a re-
mand would be necessary for an exercise of discretion in view of the
fact that even one aggravating circumstance of several was not suffici-
ently proven. This result might be avoided, however, by an explicit
statement of reasons. If, for example, the sentencing judge finds three
aggravating circumstances, and states that any one of them would in-
duce him to impose the aggravated sentence, the aggravated sentence
need not be set aside unless all three circumstances are found to be
unsupported by sufficient evidence.
155. Act of June 29, 1977, ch. 165, § 15, [1977] Cal. Stats. - (to be codified in CAL.
PENAL CODE § 1170(b), (c)).
Apparently, this requirement would include a statement of reasons for the denial of
probation. Cf. People v. Edwards, 18 Cal. 3d 796, 805, 557 P.2d 995, 1002, 135 Cal.
Rptr. 411, 418 (1976), where the California Supreme Court declined to exercise its su-
pervisory power to require a statement of reasons for denial of probation.
156. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 1237, 1259-1260 (West 1970).
157. People v. Giminez, 14 Cal. 3d 68, 71-72, 534 P.2d 65, 67, 120 Cal. Rptr. 577,
579 (1975); People v. Odle, 37 Cal. 2d 52, 58, 230 P.2d 345, 350 (1951); People v.
Lewis, 187 Cal. App. 2d 373, 377, 9 Cal. Rptr. 659, 662 (1960).
158. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1260 (West 1970).
159. CAL. RULES OF COURT 439(c) (effective July 1, 1977).
160. Id. 439(d).
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G. Applicability of the Exclusionary Rules
to Sentencing
While the right to exclude illegally obtained evidence is embodied
in due process, it is a right subject to a list of limitations and exceptions
which seems to grow with each passing term of the Supreme Court.
The Court has permitted a number of "collateral uses" of illegally ob-
tained evidence on the theory that suppression for these uses would not
further the rule's purpose of deterring official lawlessness. 1  While
the United States Supreme Court has yet to rule on the question, among
the collateral uses permitted by many lower courts is the consideration
of an appropriate sentence.'" 2
It is worth a moment's reflection, however, to ask whether the same
result should follow in the context of the factual findings required for
aggravation under the California Uniform Determinate Sentence Act.
If a defendant were on trial for armed robbery, the gun allegedly used
in the robbery would certainly be suppressed at trial if it were illegally
seized. Should the result be different where the defendant has been
convicted of robbery, and the illegally seized gun is offered as evidence
to aggravate the sentence by showing the defendant was armed?
The rationale relied upon by those courts allowing illegally obtained
evidence to be admitted at the time of sentence is that applying the
exclusionary rule at sentencing would not add in any significant way
to the deterrent effect of the rule: "[ilt is quite unlikely that law en-
forcement officials conduct illegal electronic auditing to build up an in-
ventory of information for sentencing purposes, although the evidence
would be inadmissible on the issue of guilt."1 3  This assumption may
have some validity in the context of evidence not directly related to the
underlying crime. Significantly, each of the cases admitting unlawfully
161. See, e.g., United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 447-54 (evidence obtained by state
law enforcement officer under defective warrant held admissible in federal civil tax pro-
ceeding); Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 722 (1975) (inculpatory statements made by
defendant after receiving full advisement of rights but before calling lawyer held ad-
missible solely for impeachment); United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S, 338, 351 (1974)
(witness testifying before grand jury may not refuse to answer questions on ground they
are based on illegally obtained evidence); Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 225
(1971) (illegally obtained statements of defendant held admissible solely for impeach-
ment).
162. United States v. Patrick, 542 F.2d 381, 391-92 (7th Cir. 1976); United States
v. Vandemark, 522 F.2d 1019, 1022, 1025 (9th Cir. 1975); United States v. Schipani,
435 F.2d 26, 28 (2d Cir. 1970); People v. Peterson, 9 Cal. 3d 717, 725-26, 511 P.2d
1187, 1193-94, 108 CaL Rptr. 835, 841-42 (1973); People v. Hayko, 7 Cal. App. 3d
604, 610, 86 Cal. Rptr. 726, 730 (1970).
163. United States v. Schipani, 435 F.2d 26, 28 (2d Cir. 1970).
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seized evidence at the time of sentencing dealt with evidence of unre-
lated criminal activity offered to show the character of the defendant.1 64
Where the unlawfully seized evidence related directly to the circum-
stances of the underlying crime, such as a confession disclosing details
of the crime, courts have been more reluctant to consider the evidence
for purposes of sentencing.1" 5
This distinction assumes even greater significance where the illegally
obtained evidence is used to aggravate a sentence. A police officer
is highly motivated to obtain evidence which will elevate the degree
of the crime. For example, a homicide detective who has evidence the
defendant committed a murder will certainly seek evidence of pre-
meditatibn with diligence, to justify a conviction of first degree murder.
To argue this motivation will somehow be diminished because pre-
meditation is no longer an element of the crime but has been classified
as an aggravating fact is, of course, totally specious. The catalogue of
facts which serve to aggravate a sentence will be well known to every
police officer, and gathering evidence of those facts will be a vital part
of every police investigation. Thus, the deterrent purpose of the exclu-
sionary rule will be well served by applying it to evidence offered to
prove aggravating circumstances of the crime at the time of sentencing.
Where the aggravating facts relate to the character of the defendant,
however, a different result can be justified. Such evidence may have
been sought in an independent investigation for a different purpose,
and the purpose of the exclusionary rule would be little served by sup-
pressing the evidence for an unanticipated use.
One final note must be added with respect to proof of facts that can
be alternatively used for enhancement or aggravation under the Califor-
nia law. If pleaded and proved as enhancement, the exclusionary rules
would most certainly apply. If the exclusionary rule were not applied
to hearings on aggravation, this would place the availability of the ex-
clusionary rule in the hands of the prosecutor, raising the equal protec-
tion problem already discussed in previous sections. But more impor-
tantly, the police officer seizing the evidence has no idea whether it
will be used for enhancement or aggravation. To exclude the evi-
dence in one case and admit it in the other on grounds there is some
difference in the deterrent effect upon police officers is to engage in
a fiction worthy of the brothers Grimm.
164. See cases cited note 162 supra.
165. United States ex rel. Brown v. Rundle, 417 F.2d 282, 284-85 (3d Cir. 1969);
United States ex rel. Rivers v. Myers, 384 F.2d 737, 742-43 (3d Cir. 1967); United
States ex rel. Cleveland v. Casscles, 354 F. Supp. 114, 118-19 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
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IV. CONCLUSION
While the California Uniform Determinate Sentencing Act may
achieve greater consistency in sentencing, this result cannot be attained
at the expense of the procedural guarantees of due process. It appears
that the last minute "tinkering" with the statute creates serious consti-
tutional problems in terms of denying a defendant the right to notice
and an opportunity to confront and cross-examine witnesses. The "ag-
gravating circumstances" formulated by the Judicial Council also suffer
from excessive vagueness in several respects. The option of proceed-
ing in the form of "enhancement" or "aggravation" raises a substantial
equal protection claim to proof beyond a reasonable doubt and a jury
trial in aggravation proceedings. Finally, the exclusionary rules will,
in some cases, require the suppressing of evidence relied upon to show
aggravation. My own prediction is that the inevitable injection of all
of these procedural rights into the sentencing process will render the
"aggravation" procedure a useless dead letter which will seldom be in-
voked. As a practical matter, judges will have a choice of only the
middle term or the lower term. Thus, even less discretion will be avail-
able to sentencing judges than the Uniform Determinate Sentencing
Act envisioned.
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